Sevgili dostum Murat Ocak ile yazdığımız “Do government-experienced auditors reduce audit quality?” başlıklı makalemiz Managerial Auditing Journal‘da (SSCI – Q3, ABDC – B) yayımlanmıştır. Çalışmanın sonuçlarına ait özet aşağıda sunulmuştur.
The main findings are consistent with conjecture. Government-experienced auditors do not enhance AQ. They are aggressive, and they complete audit work slowly and they cannot detect discretionary accruals effectively. Spending more time in a government agency makes them more aggressive and slow, and they do not detect earnings management practices. The Heckman estimation results regarding the variable of interest are also consistent with the main estimation results. In addition, the authors found in predicting government-experienced auditor choice that family firms, domestic firms and firms that reported losses (larger firms, older firms) are more (less) likely to choose government-experienced auditors.